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that he intended to deprive his victim of personal liberty); Barnett v.
Commonwealth, 216 Va. 200,202,217 S.E.2d 828 (1975) (holding
the intimidation or force element may be achieved by physical
violence or the threat of it: defendant threatened to shoot his victim if
she did not get in his car and she got in the car after believing she
heard the "click" of a gun); Brown v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 310,
314,337 S.E.2d 711 (1985) (holding that the initial detention,
through assaults and threats of violence, was different in time and
place, and in "quantity and quality the acts of force and intimidation
employed in the abduction were separate and apart from the restraint
inherent in the commission of rape"); Cf., Johnson v. Commonwealth,
221 Va. 872, 879, 275 S.E.2d 592 (1981) (holding a conviction for
abduction not supported by evidence that defendant broke into
victim's apartment and grabbed her and then fled, because he did this
in furtherance of sexual advances and he did not intend to deprive his
victim of her personal liberty, "although such a deprivation did occur
momentarily").
Like robbery in the capital context, § 18.2-47 abduction is
subject to broad judicial interpretation. As noted above, practically
any detention, no matter how slight, may constitute an abduction,
even without the element of asportation. Scott at 524. The legislature,
however, has provided that only a much narrower range of abduction
is applicable to capital cases.
A willful, deliberate and premeditated killing of "any person in
the commission of abduction, as defined in §18.2-48, when such
abduction was committed with the intent to extort money or a
pecuniary benefit" is an offense of capital murder under Virginia
Code § 18.2-31(1). Also, § 18.2-31(8) states that the
... willful, deliberate and premeditated killing of a child
under the age of twelve years in the commission of
abduction as defined in § 18.2-48 when such abduction
was committed with the intent to extort money or a
pecuniary benefit, or with the intent to defile the victim of
such abduction.
Section 18.2-48 abduction includes four aggravating elements
that elevate § 18.2-47 abduction to § 18.2-48 abduction: intent to
extort money, or pecuniary benefit, intent to defile, and female under
sixteen years of age for the purpose of concubinage or prostitution.
To elevate a homicide to capital murder under § 18.2-31(1)
and §18.2-31(8), there must have been a § 18.2-48 abduction. Thus
though basic abduction is broadly construed, the legislature has
identified only two situations where certain types of abduction will
support a capital charge under § 18.2-31(1) and three situations to
support a capital charge under § 18.2-31(8). In other words, the
statutory language of § 18.2-31 permits a capital murder charge only
when a willful, deliberate and premeditated killing has occurred in
the commission of some of the particular types of abduction set out in
§ 18.2-48.
Section 18.2-31(1) makes reference to extortion(for money or
a pecuniary benefit) as the only type of abduction that may support a
capital murder charge for the killing of "any person." The defendant
need not successfully extort, but he must at least intend to extort.
Section 18.2-31(8) includes all of the aggravators, except abduction
of a minor female for immoral purposes, to support a capital murder
charge for the killing of a child under twelve. Abduction, therefore, is
broadly construed in the non-capital context and the court typically
will find a force or intimidation element, no matter how slight, and a
detention, no matter how brief. When abduction is used as a capital
aggravator, abduction is defined more narrowly as the legislature has
mandated that only particular types of abduction will support capital
charges (the financial types under § 18.2-31(1) and the financial
types plus intent to defile under § 18.2-31(8).
There have been to date no capital murder prosecutions under
either § 18.2-31(1) or § 18.2-31(8). Consequently, it is unknown
whether the Supreme Court of Virginia, as it has done with robbery,
will place a different gloss on the construction of the non-capital
offense when it is used to elevate murder to capital murder.
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? - POST-CONVICTION REVIEW OF DEATH SENTENCES
By: Juliette A. Falkner
The trial of capital cases should be undertaken with the
knowledge that there are eight further steps possible for judicial
review of a conviction and sentence of death. However, the protec-
tions offered by such extensive review may become virtually
nonexistent if trial attorneys do not keep in mind the law governing
these further proceedings. Likewise, mistakes in representation of
capital defendants at appellate and collateral stages in the state
system may become fatal to further efforts to secure meaningful
review in the federal system. This article is but a primer, designed
only to introduce counsel to some of the issues important at each step
of the post-conviction process.1
DIRECT APPEAL:
In Virginia after the trial court enters a final judgment
sentencing an individual to death, that decision is automatically
appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia.2 On direct appeal, the
Supreme Court of Virginia must 1) review the assignments of errors,
2) determine if the trier of fact imposed the death sentence in an
arbitrary or capricious manner and 3) decide if the death sentence is
"excessive or disproportionate" compared to the penalty in similar
cases?
The severe and irreversible nature of the death penalty requires
"a greater degree of reliability when it is imposed." However, the
safeguards which promote this greater degree of reliability only apply
during the trial and direct appeal.5 The U.S. Supreme Court has
made this clean ... [Ilt must be remembered that the direct appeal is
the primary avenue of review of a conviction or sentence, and death
penalty cases are no exception.6
Virginia has a contemporaneous objection rule" applicable to
trials and appealss Under this rule an appellate court will not
consider any assignment of error unless:
1. The objection was made with reasonable certainty at the
time of the ruling;9
2. The grounds for the objection were stated at the time of the
ruling.'
0
The purpose of the rule is to allow the trial court the first opportunity
to decide questions of evidence and procedure.'" Objections not made
in conformity with this rule will not be considered, "unless for good
cause shown"12 or "in the interest of justice."13 Good cause includes
no previous opportunity to object.' 4 "In the interest of justice" means
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that there was a miscarriage of justice apparent on the record.' 5 For
example, a defendant sentenced for a crime different from that which
he was convicted.' 6
Application of the contemporaneous objection rule is a matter
of state law."7 Therefore if an attorney fails to raise claims of error at
trial or on direct appeal, procedural default18 may bar consideration
of the claim in a subsequent habeas petition. Wainwright v. Sykes.19
The Fourth Circuit explained Wainwright in Cole v. Stevenson:
2°
As we construe Wainwright v. Sykes... we are of the
opinion that the prisoner is barred from litigating his claim
on federal habeas corpus because in his direct appeal he (1)
failed to except to the alleged error [which occurred at the
trial level] ... in his assignments of error on appeal as
required by [state procedural rules] and (2) failed to
otherwise raise the issue in his appeal. These two failures
foreclosed both direct and collateral attack of the conviction
in [state] courts and are an adequate and separate State
ground for denying relief.21
Hence, the direct appeal is a critical stage for the presentation and
preservation of all state and federal claims which arose during the
trial and may be the basis for a collateral attack. Further, capital
practice requires that all errors be preserved on appeal, not just those
thought to be most likely to persuade the Supreme Court of Virginia.
WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES:
The main purpose of the writ of certiorari is to persuade the
Court that defendant's case raises unresolved issues or involves
conflicting lower court opinions respecting important federal rights.
22
Thus, the petition is not simply an appeal or claim of error on the
merits of the case. 23 In Williams v. Missouri4 the Supreme Court of
the United States recognized the importance of petitioning the High
Court after the direct appeal. 2 "MThe defendant must have at least one
opportunity to present to the Court his full claims that his death-
sentence has been imposed unconstitutionally. ' ' 6 Thus, when the
Supreme Court of Virginia affirms the death sentence and denies a
petition for rehearing, a petition for writ of certiorari should be filed
with the United States Supreme Court.
Occasionally, a defendant sentenced to death decides not to
appeal his or her sentence.27 In these instances, other individuals may
attempt to continue the appellate process as defendant's "next of
friend" or "best friend.' " However, the Court has been reluctant to
hear such cases, particularly when defendant made a "knowing and
intelligent waiver of any and all federal rights he might have."
Gilmore v. Utah. 29 Consequently, the Court generally dismisses these
suits for lack of standing."
The United States Supreme Court requires a criminal defendant
to file a petition for writ of certiorari within ninety days after the
petition for rehearing is denied by the highest state court of compe-
tent jurisdiction. 31 When filing the writ, an attorney should also file
for a stay of execution. In Williams the Court seems to make the stay
of an execution a constitutional requirement pending the disposition
of the first writ of certiorari. ". .. [I] f a state schedules an execution
to take place before the filing and disposition of a petition for
certiorari, it must stay that execution pending completion of the direct
review as a matter of course." '32 During the initial petition for cert.,
the attorney must first request the stay from the appropriate state
court. If the state court refuses the stay, the Supreme Court will grant
it?3
Three documents should be filed with the cert. petition: 1) an
application for a stay of execution pending the resolution of the cert.
petition; 2) a motion to proceed in forma pauperis; 3) a notarized
affidavit in support of the motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
STATE HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS
In Virginia, a capital criminal defendant may petition for a writ
of habeas corpus to the circuit which entered the original (judgment
order of conviction) sentence. Upon denial of the writ by the
appropriate circuit court, the defendant may appeal to the Virginia
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Virginia.34 However, only
the Supreme Court of Virginia has the authority to hear habeas
appeals concerning a capital murder conviction?5 The Court of
Appeals' habeas corpus jurisdiction is limited to those "cases over
which" it has jurisdiction on direct appeal.3 " Consequently, the Court
of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to hear habeas appeals from a circuit
court which imposed the death penalty?7 The right to appellate
review is a statutory right and is "not a necessary element of due
process; thus, no due process violation occurs if an appeal to a state
court is barred.",
3
Habeas corpus petitions must allege sufficient facts, which if
proven, support the legal claims made in the petition. 39 Unless the
habeas attorney shows that the factual findings of the trial court are
"plainly wrong or unsupported by credible evidence," the habeas
court will uphold such factual determinationsY' Therefore the proper
presentation of these claims requires a factual re-investigation of the
defendant's case which includes interviewing the defense and
Commonwealth's attorneys, the trial judge, the jury and all the
witnesses. An evidentiary hearing is often sought and granted on
these claims.4'
The claims brought in state habeas should be claims defendant
also wants to raise in federal habeas corpus but have not yet been
exhausted.42 Every possible claim should be raised in state habeas.
The response of the Attorney General will typically seek to avoid a
decision on the merits of the claim in one of two ways. First, by
asserting that the claim is procedurally barred. Second, by claiming
that the Supreme Court has decided the claim adversely to the
defendant and the Circuit Court is without power to grant relief.
43
Federal review may be barred only if the assertion of procedural bar
prevails. Claims typically available for the first time at state habeas
include ineffective assistance of counsel or the due process discovery
obligations under Brady v. Maryland
4
In Fitzgerald"5 the Virginia Court of Appeals adopted the Fifth
Circuit's characterization of a Brady violation:
The basic import of Brady is ... that there is an obligation
on the part of the prosecution to produce certain evidence
actually or constructively in its possession or accessible to
it in the interests of inherent fairness. If disclosures were
excused in instances where the prosecution has not sought
out information readily available to it, we would be inviting
and placing a premium on conduct unworthy of representa-
tives of the United States Government.
United States v. Auten. Thus, a prosecutor's office cannot get
around Brady by keeping itself in ignorance. In order to uncover any
potential Brady violations the habeas attorney must re-investigate the
case against the defendant to determine what evidence the Common-
wealth attorney had and gave to the defense attorney.
A prima facie showing of evidence, which if true, shows
defendant is being illegally detained, entitles the defendant to a
hearing on his petition.
In order to allege the facts necessary for a prima facie showing
of ineffective assistance of counsel47 a convicted defendant must
indicate two things:
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First, defendant must show that his counsel's performance
was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amend-
ment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing
that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said
that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a
breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result
unreliable.
Strickland v. Washington.4 There is a strong presumption that a
defendant's counsel is effective under the Sixth Amendment.4 9
Therefore, in order to satisfy this two-part test, the habeas attorney
needs to make a full review of the trial attorney's efforts regarding
the criminal investigation, development of a case in mitigation,
pretrial motions/hearings and trial advocacy (failures to make
appropriate objections). It is important to determine what the trial
attorney knew at the time tactical decisions were made.
The habeas attorney also needs to make a statement of
principles and law relating to each claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel raised on behalf of the defendant 50 A generalized statement
referring to ineffective assistance of counsel claims which are not
briefed constitute a waiver of such claims5 l
As discussed below state habeas is critical to preserving
some issues for federal review. Hence, the re-investigation of
defendant's case ensures that all potential issues are fairly presented
to the state courts5 2 Direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia,
followed by petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court is also available following denial of state habeas
relief.
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS:
Federal courts have jurisdiction to hear federal claims
presented by state prisoners under 28 U.S.C § 2254. A state prisoner
should file his petition in the district court in which the prisoner is
incarcerated or in the district court in which his sentencing court is
located. 3 In order for a federal court of appeals to review a district
court's denial of a habeas petition, the district court must grant a
certificate of probable cause to appeal.3 4 The district court may
consider the nature of the death penalty; however, standing alone, this
issue is insufficient for granting the certificate.5
The federal habeas petitioner must show a violation of a
federally protected right.56 Unless a claim violates the "Constitution,
laws or treaties of the United States"57 it is not cognizable in federal
habeas proceedings." The following is a short list of cognizable
issues for federal habeas corpus: l)jury composition and selection
processes;5 9 2)trial court's refusal to allow defendant to present
mitigation evidence during sentencing phase of trial;60 3)jurors told
that they were not responsible for determining the appropriateness of
the death sentence in a particular case;61 4)claims for ineffective
assistance of counsel;62 5)contradictory and confusing jury instruc-
tions on defendant's claim of self-defense.
6 3
Before a claim can be raised in federal habeas corpus, the
petitioner must "exhaust" all state remedies.64 Petitioner satisfies the
exhaustion requirement after his federal claim has been "fairly
presented" to the state courts.65 A claim has been fairly presented
when the substantial factual and legal equivalent of petitioner's
federal claim was presented in the state proceedings. 66 In short,
petitioner exhausts his claim when the "controlling legal principles"
and "the facts bearing upon that constitutional claim" were raised in
state court."6 7 If the Supreme Court of Virginia considers petitioner's
claim on direct appeal, it probably is not necessary for petitioner to
exhaust other state remedies.68 The federal court may hear facts
presented for the first time on federal review where the petitioner had
not withheld such evidence to expedite federal review.69
A federal court must dismiss a habeas petition containing
exhausted and unexhausted claims, a "mixed petition." If petitioner
files a "mixed petition" he may return to the state courts to exhaust
all his claims or amend his petition to include only his exhausted
claims.
71
The federal courts may waive the exhaustion requirement if
appealing to the state courts is futile,12 out of judicial efficiency and
fairness or if the parties agree to the waiver. 3 Appealing to a state
court is futile when a state remedy is unavailable to petitioner for
some reason other than the petitioner's deliberate choice or default.
Thus, if the federal court determines there was a state remedy
available to petitioner, even If futile, the failure to raise the claim in
the state's available proceeding will result in a procedural default.
Thus, raising all potential federal claims during pre-trial, trial and
direct appeal and all post-conviction proceedings preserves any
potential claim(s) from waiver or procedural default on an adequate
and independent state ground. 4 Such procedural default forfeits an
otherwise valid claim because petitioner failed to follow a state
procedural rule. Generally, this occurs when petitioner, through his
counsel, fails to make a timely objection at trial or raise an issue on
direct appeal according to a state contemporaneous objection rule. s
As a result, state law procedurally bars a state court from deciding the
merits of the issue. 6
The novelty of a claim, however, may excuse default. The
issue is whether the claim was available at the time of the default." If
the claim was "percolating in lower courts for years" at the time of
petitioner's default, the claim is not so novel as to excuse procedural
default.7l In addition to a default on an independent and adequate
state ground, failure to raise a potentially meritorious claim based on
the federal constitution may insulate that issue from federal review.
Therefore, during the trial and direct appeal issues must be raised and
preserved on federal grounds.9
In order to find a procedural default, the federal court must
examine six factors":
1. Whether petitioner actually violated a state procedural
rule.
1
2. Whether the state procedural rule serves a legitimate state
interest and is an independent and adequate ground for
denying federal relief.
8 2
3. Whether the state rule is firmly established and regularly
followed by the state courts
8 3
4. Whether the state courts forgave the default by considering the
claim on its merits
8 4
5. Whether the state forgave the default by failing to timely argue
procedural default.8 5
6. Whether petitioner overcomes the default by a "deliberate
bypass" or "good cause and actual prejudice."
In considering the sixth factor, justices generally apply the
"good cause and actual prejudice" standard articulated in Wainwright
v. Sykes for decisions ordinarily made by counsel8 6 However, the
"deliberate bypass" standard articulated in Faye v. Noia" should be
urged when the decision was one not ordinarily made by counsel.
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Such decisions include: whether to waive counsel, whether to plead
guilty and whether to waive a trial by jury.
If the court determines that the cause and prejudice standard
applies, both prongs of the cause and prejudice standard must be met
by the petitioner. Cause can be shown when: (1) counsel was
responsible for the default and was therefore ineffective; s (2)
counsel did not reasonably have the legal claim available because the
claim is so "novel";8 9 (3) counsel was prevented from constructing or
raising the claim; 90 (4) counsel was acting against the known desire
of petitioner.
91
Actual prejudice is met when petitioner shows the errors at
trial created an actual and substantial disadvantage infecting his
entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions
92
Furthermore, in "extraordinary cases, relief may be granted
although the default is not overcome through the traditional test." The
principles of comity and finality will yield where a constitutional
violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is
actually innocent.9 Upon the securing of a Certificate of Probable
Cause, denials of habeas relief by the federal district court may be
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
and thereafter, by certiorari, to the United States Supreme Court.
'Materials available from the Virginia Capital Case Clearing-
house can provide more detailed assistance to counsel in negotiating
the perilous post-conviction review process. In addition, the program
is able to serve the true clearinghouse function of putting attorneys,
unaccustomed with collateral review procedures, in touch with
experts in the capital defense community who are willing to provide
assistance and mentoring.
2Va. Code Ann. § 17-110.1(A) (1983) ("A sentence of death,
upon the judgment thereon becoming final in the circuit court, shall
be reviewed on the record by the Supreme Court.").
3See Va. Code Ann. § 17-110.1(C)(1-2) (Supp. 1983).
4Lockeu v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 603, 98 S. Ct. 2594, 2614, 57
L. Ed. 2d 973, 988 (1978).
Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 2770, 106 L. Ed. 2d 1
(1990) (generally discussing the Court's refusal to apply stricter
standards of due process in state and federal proceedings); Smith v.
Murray, 477 U.S. 527,537, 106 S. Ct. 2661, 91 L. Ed. 2d 454 (1986)
("We reject the suggestion that the principles [standard of review for
federal habeas corpus] apply differently depending on the nature of
the penalty a state imposes for the violation of its criminal laws.").
6Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3391,
77 L. Ed. 2d 1090, 1100 (1983).
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2Va. Sup.Ct. Rules 5:25.
13Id.
4Mason v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 339, 373 S.E.2d 603
(1988).
15Johnson v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 529, 365 S.E.2d 237
(1988); Mounce v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 433,357 S.E.2d 742
(1987).
6Brown v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 126, 380 S.E.2d 8
(1989).
7Graves v. Garraghty, 618 F. Supp. 1348 (E.D. Va. 1985).
1sinfra.
"9Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,97 S. Ct. 2497, 53 L Ed.
2d 594; Slayton v. Parrigan 215 Va. 27, 205 S.E.2d 680 (1974), cert.
denied sub nom. Parrigan v. Paderick, 419 U.S. 1108 (1975); see
also Whitley v. Bair, 802 F.2d 1487 (4th Cir. 1985).
20620 F.2d 1055, 1056-57 (4th Cir. 19 ) cert. denied. 449 U.S.
1004 (1980).2 1d.
2 2E. GRESSMAN, R. STERN, S. SHAPIRO, SUPREME
COURT PRACTICE (6th Ed. 1986).231d.
24463 U.S. 1301, 103 S. Ct. 3521, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1282 (1983).
2s"ff a federal question is involved, the process of direct review
includes the right to petition this Court for a writ of certiorari." Id., at
1283. 26Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 888 (1983).
27Gressman, at 704.
2Sd.
29429 U.S. 1012 (1976)
3°Gressman, at 705. Recently, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari and heard oral argument on precisely this issue in
Simmons v. Arkansas, 298 Ark. 193, 766 S.W.2d 422, cert. granted,
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 109 S. Ct. 3240, 106 L Ed. 2d 588 (1989).31Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States 58 U.S.L.W.
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Court).32Williams, 463 U.S. at 1301.
33Sup.Ct.Rule 44; Gressman, at § 17.2.
34Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-654, § 17-110.1.
3SId.
3Va.Code Ann. § 17-116.04; Peterson v. Bass, 2 Va. App.
314,318, 343 S.E.2d 475, 478 aff d en banc, 2 Va. App. 314,349
S.E.2d 409 (1986).
37Id. at 478. In Peterson, the defendant was convicted of capital
murder for a killing in the commission of a robbery. After the
Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed his conviction, defendant
initiated a writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court challenging his
detention for capital murder, robbery, and use of a firearm in the
commission of a felony. The circuit court denied defendant the writ
and he appealed to the Virginia Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals held that because it lacked jurisdiction to hear death penalty
cases on direct appeal, the defendant was also prohibited from
appealing his habeas petition to the Virginia Court of Appeals.
Consequently, the court only had jurisdiction to hear the non-capital
challenges of his detention (robbery and the use of a firearm in the
commission of a felony). While these challenges were related to
defendant's capital murder conviction, they were not direct chal-
lenges to the imposition of the death penalty. Id. However, the Court
of Appeals will hear a habeas appeal from a circuit court on the non-
capital convictions. Fitzgerald v. Bass, 6 Va. App. 38, 366 S.E.2d
615 (1988) (dismissing capital defendant's appeal dealing with his
capital murder conviction).
"Payne v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 460, 357 S.E.2d 500
(1987).
39Fitzgeraldv. Bass, 6 Va. App. 38, 366 S.E.2d 615 (1988).
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1 Va. App. 443, 339 S.E.2d 897 (1986).
"See Cartera v. Mitchell, 553 F. Supp. 866 (E.D. Va. 1982)
holding constitutional issues may be raised on habeas corpus unless
prisoner has had full and fair opportunity to raise his constitutional
claims at trial).
43The first assertion, that the claim is procedurally barred is
discussed in Slayton, 215 Va. 27, 205 S.E.2d 680 (1974). For a
discussion of the second claim, that the Supreme Court has decided
-the claim adversely to the defendant, see Hawks v. Cox, 211 Va. 91,
175 S.E.2d 271 (1970).
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functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied
on as having produced a just result." Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 692-93
(1984).
4466 U. S. at 687.
49Id.
5°Va. Sup.Ct. Rules 5:25.
511d.; see also, Quintana v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 127, 134,
n.1, 295 S.E.2d 643, 645-46, n.l (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1029
(1983).
52Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S. Ct. 509,30 L. Ed.
2d 438 (1971); see also, infra federal habeas corpus.
5328 U.S.C. § 2241(d).
54463 U.S. at 892-93.
51Id. at 893.
s6Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)(1982).
5728 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982). The Court excludes Fourth
Amendment search and seizure claims from federal habeas review
where the state provides an opportunity for full and fair litigation of
the issue. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S. CL 3037,49 L. Ed. 2d
1067 (1976). However, a federal court has authority to hear a claim
stating ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to raise the Fourth
Amendment issue in the appropriate state court. Kimmelman v.
Morrison, 477 U.S. 365,96 S. Ct. 3037,49 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1986).
5828 U.S.C. 2254(a) (1982).
59See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 104 S. Ct. 871, 79 L. Ed.
2d 29 (1984) (unless a constitutional violation occurs at trial, state
law governs and there is no constitutional violation).
6 Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 108 S. Ct. 1771, 1775, 100 L.
Ed. 2d 249 (1988).
61Hitchcockv. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393,395-99, 107 S. Ct. 1821,
1824 95 L. Ed. 2d 347, 351-53 (1987).
62Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 86 L.
Ed. 2d 231 (1985).
63Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
6428 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1982).
65Picard, 404 U.S. at 275.
6 6d.
671d. at 276-77.
6'Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 447, 73 S. Ct. 397, 402, 97 L.
Ed. 469,483-84 (1953); see also, Castille v. Peoples, 109 S. Ct.
1056, 1059, 103 L. Ed. 2d 192 (1989) (dictum, holding that forcing a
petitioner to exhaust other state remedies is "to mandate recourse to
state collateral review whose results have effectively been predeter-
mined, or permanently to bar from federal habeas prisoners in States
whose post-conviction procedures are technically inexhaustible").
69See also, Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 106 S. Ct. 617, 88
L. Ed. 2d 598 (1986) (federal district court could hear claim where
evidence was presented for the first time on federal review and
petitioner had not withheld such evidence to expedite federal review);
Renzi v. Virginia, 794 F.2d 155, 158 (4th Cir. 1986).
"Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 102 S. Ct. 1198, 71 L. Ed. 2d
379 (1982); Stamper v. Baskerville, 724 F.2d 1106, 1108 (4th Cir.
1984) (dismissing both exhausted and unexhausted claims without
prejudice).
71Rose, 455 U.S. at 510.
7228 U.S.C. § 2254; Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249,92
S. Ct. 407, 30 L. Ed.2d 418 (1971) (holding petitioner satisfied
exhaustion requirement where he demonstrated that appeal would be
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